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Abstract—Autonomous vehicles (AV) have progressed rapidly
with the advancements in computer vision algorithms. The
deep convolutional neural network as the main contributor
to this advancement has boosted the classification accuracy
dramatically. However, the discovery of adversarial examples
reveals the generalization gap between dataset and the real
world. Furthermore, affine transformations may also confuse
computer vision based object detectors. The degradation of the
perception system is undesirable for safety critical systems such
as autonomous vehicles. In this paper, a deep learning system
is proposed: Affine Disentangled GAN (ADIS-GAN), which is
robust against affine transformations and adversarial attacks. It
is demonstrated that conventional data augmentation for affine
transformation and adversarial attacks are orthogonal, while
ADIS-GAN can handle both attacks at the same time. Useful
information such as image rotation angle and scaling factor
are also generated in ADIS-GAN. On MNIST dataset, ADIS-
GAN can achieve over 98 percent classification accuracy within
30 degrees rotation, and over 90 percent classification accuracy
against FGSM and PGD adversarial attack.
Index Terms—autonomous vehicles; deep convolutional neu-
ral network; adversarial example; affine transformation; inter-
pretability
I. INTRODUCTION & RELATED WORK
Autonomous vehicles (AV) have received much attention
in recent years. One pillar of AV perception systems is
the RGB data captured by the camera. Through the RGB
data, the system can understand its surrounding environment,
including the location of vehicles, pedestrians and other crucial
information. The deep convolutional neural network (CNN)
is a widely accepted cutting-edge computer vision algorithm
[15] [9] [27] to process the RGB data, for detecting objects,
segmenting urban scenes, etc. Despite the tremendous success
accomplished by deep CNN models, the adversarial examples
show that there are still reliability and robustness issues (see
Fig. 1). The adversarial images are visually indistinguishable
for a human viewer, but state-of-the-art classifiers make wrong
predictions with high confidence for those images. Since the
first publication of adversarial attack [28], numerous studies
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have appeared on this topic [1], [2], [8], [16], [19]–[21], [25],
[29], which mainly consider pixel level perturbations. Such
adversarial attacks on CNN raise concerns that the perception
system of the autonomous vehicle can be maliciously hacked.
Fig. 1. An adversarial attack on a car image. Left: without adversarial attack,
the classification result is “minivan”. Right: with FGSM adversarial attack,
the classifier labels this image as “car wheel” instead of “minivan”. Testing
algorithm: ResNet-50 [9].
In [5], it was shown that simple affine transformations (e.g.,
rotations) can cause deep CNNs to misclassify images. The
images captured by the perception system could experience
similar affine distortions during normal driving scenarios when
vehicles are passing water puddles (see Fig. 2) or on rural
roads. Both adversarial attack and affine distortions need to
be addressed before integrating deep CNN vision systems into
safety-related applications like autonomous vehicle at large
scale.
GAN [7] has been widely studied and utilized since its
invention. It is a generative model which captures high-
dimensional data distribution through adversarial process. It
can generate images that simulate the training images such as
hand written digits, animals, vehicles, etc. Deep Convolutional
GAN [22] introduces convolution mechanism into the GAN
structure by inserting the deconvolution layers in the generator
network. Bi-directional GAN [4] further provides a pathway
to convert data from image space back to latent space with ad-
ditional encoder network. InfoGAN [3] utilizes a disentangled
representation that separates features and noise in the latent
space. The separated features can represent categorical and
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Fig. 2. When the vehicle hits a water puddle, the images captured by
the camera will be tilted. As a result, the RGB-based object detector may
misclassify objects in scenes.
Fig. 3. Rotation of vehicle images. The vehicle tends to be detected incorrectly
when the image is tilted. Testing algorithm: Inception v3 [27].
continuous attributes of the training images. In [18], the issue
of inductive bias in disentangled representation is discussed.
In [10], the concept of symmetry group concept is introduced
to define disentanglement behaviour. DefenceGAN [24] uses
GAN as a defence method against adversarial attacks.
Several studies address invariance property of deep CNN
for affine transformations. In [13], anti-distortion classification
result is achieved by inserting Spatial Transformer layer into
the given network. However the affine parameters are not
presented in a disentangled manner, which makes it less in-
terpretable. Transforming Autoencoder [11] uses auto-encoder
to model 2D affine transformation applied to images. The
trained generative model can learn to generate transformed
images in a disentangled way. However it does not tackle the
improvement on classification accuracy. In [6], transformations
that preserve the object identity are analyzed in the symmetry
group. In [14] [26], filter banks are designed to make the
classifier transformation invariant.
Our Contributions
1) We introduce Affine Disentangled GAN (ADIS-GAN)
which is robust against both affine transformation and
adversarial attack. It achieves classification accuracies
comparable to that of state-of-the-art supervised learning
algorithm, although it is an unsupervised algorithm.
2) We show that affine transformation augmented train-
ing and adversarial augmented training are orthogonal,
which means they can only defend typical attack they
have been trained on.
3) Affine Disentangled GAN is more interpretable, pro-
viding information that helps to understand potential
misclassifications. On MNIST dataset, it can achieve
over 98 percent classification accuracy within 30 degrees
rotation, and over 90 percent classification accuracy
against FGSM and PGD adversarial attack.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Generative Adversarial Network
GAN [7] is a generative model which captures high-
dimensional data distribution through adversarial process: a
mini-max game between the generator and discriminator. The
generator tries to produce images that are similar to real
ones, while the discriminator judges whether the images are
generated or real. During the training process, the generator
will create images that do not belong to the original dataset.
Those images may prevent the model from overfitting, and
the model is more likely to learn a smoother data distribution
which involves the adversarial samples. The vanilla GAN
formulation is:
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) :=Ex∼Pdata(x) log[D(x)]
+ Ez∼Pz(z) log[1−D(G(z))].
(1)
A standard distribution z ∼ Pz in the latent space can
be transferred to data space Px through generator G. The
discriminator D judges whether the samples are from training
dataset x or generated dataset G(z).
Bi-directional GAN [4] adds an encoder to the vanilla
GAN, which makes the image to latent and latent to image
transformation possible. The encoder and generator together
can be treated as a filter where the reconstructed images may
only keep meaningful information and discard noise such as
adversarial perturbation. The Bi-directional GAN formulation
is:
min
G,E
max
D
V (D,G,E) :=Ex∼Pdata(x) log[D(x,E(x))]
+ Ez∼Pz(z) log[1−D(z,G(z))].
(2)
InfoGAN [3] can assign the latent vectors semantic mean-
ings such as categorical and continuous information (e.g. skew
of an image) by maximizing the mutual information between
generated latent space and reconstructed latent space. The
InfoGAN formulation is:
min
G,Q
max
D
V (D,G,Q) := Ex∼Pdata(x) log[D(x)]
+ Ez∼Pz(z),c∼Pc(c) log[1−D(G(c, z))]− λI(c,Q(G(c, z))).
(3)
Bi-directional Info GAN [12] uses encoder E instead aux-
iliary Q to reconstruct the latent vectors. The Bi-directional
InfoGAN formulation is :
min
G,E
max
D
V (D,G,E) := Ex∼Pdata(x) log[D(x,E(x))]
+ Ez∼Pz(z),c∼Pc(c) log[1−D((c, z), G(c, z))]
− λI(c, E(G(c, z))).
(4)
B. Affine Transformation Matrix
Inspired by [13], we utilize the affine matrix as a regularizer
in our model. Conventional affine matrix is a 2 by 3 matrix,
matrix defined as:
[
A11 A12 A13
A21 A22 A23
]
. (5)
A13 and A23 represent the horizontal and vertical translation
parameters respectively. These 2 parameters can be removed
from the affine matrix without affecting other affine properties.
The affine matrix becomes a 2 by 2 matrix after removing the
translation parameters. It can be decomposed as rotation, skew,
and zoom matrix respectively (see Appendix for an alternative
formulation):
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
]
=
[
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
] [
1 m
n 1
] [
p 0
0 q
]
. (6)
III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A. Affine Regularizer
Since the images captured by the camera usually will not
be skewed during normal driving scenarios, we only focus on
rotation and zoom attributes in this paper. If we discard skew
matrix, the affine matrix equation can be simplified as follows:
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
]
=
[
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
] [
p 0
0 q
]
, (7)
where:
A11 = p(cos θ), (8)
A12 = q(− sin θ), (9)
A21 = p(sin θ), (10)
A22 = q(cos θ). (11)
Assume each image is composed of an affine matrix M and
a base image I . The input image Iori from training dataset can
be expressed as:
Iori =M1I0. (12)
The scaled image Iscaled transformed from Iori with prede-
fined affine matrix Mtransform can be expressed as:
Iscaled =MtransformIori. (13)
With the assumption, the scaled image Iscaled can also be
expressed as:
Iscaled =M2I0. (14)
Through simple matrix manipulation we can obtain the
affine regularizer:
Mtransform =M2(M1)
−1. (15)
B. Model Architecture
The Affine Disentangled GAN (ADIS-GAN) maximizes
the mutual information between generated affine matrix and
reconstructed affine matrix with the assumption of affine
regularizer (see Fig. 4). Three continuous latent vectors are
assigned to p, q, and θ respectively. Those continuous latent
vectors are sampled from a random uniform distribution. They
can be converted to Mtransform through (8) – (11). Similarly,
training images Xreal and transformed images Xtransform are
encoded to continuous latent vectors through the encoder. They
can be further converted to M1 and M2 through equations
(8) – (11). Finally, the mutual information will be maximized
between Mtransform and M2 ∗ (M1)−1 via (15). The updated
loss function with affine regularizer is:
min
G,E
max
D
V (D,G,E) := Ex∼Pdata(x) log[D(x,E(x))]
+ Ez∼Pz(z),c∼Pc(c),cA∼PcA (cA) log[1−D((c, cA, z), G(c, cA, z))]
− λI((c, cA), E(G(c, cA, z)))− λI(Mtransform,M2 ∗M−11 )
TABLE I
LAYER INFORMATION
Block
Layer Encoder Generator Discriminator
Input 28x28 72 2x28, 72
NN 3x3x16 convLReLU,dropout
128x7x7 fc
ReLU
3x3x16 conv
LReLU, dropout, BN
NN 3x3x32 convLReLU,dropout
3x3x16 deconv
ReLU, BN
3x3x32 conv
LReLU, dropout, BN
NN 3x3x64 convLReLU,dropout
3x3x32 deconv
ReLU, BN
3x3x64 conv
LReLU,dropout, BN
NN
3x3x128 conv
LReLU, dropout
BN
3x3x64 deconv
ReLU, BN
3x3x128 conv
LReLU,dropout, BN
NN 1024 fcLReLU
3x3x128 deconv
ReLU, BN
1024 fc
LReLU
NN - 3x3x1 convtanh
1024 fc
LReLU
NN - - 1 fcsigmoid
Output categorical: 10 fcsoftmax image: 28x28 real/fake: 1
Output continuous: 3 fc - -
Output noise: 59 fctanh - -
NN for neural network, fc for fully connected, conv for convolution,
deconv for deconvolution, BN for batch normalization
Fig. 4. Model architecture. Diamond boxes are affine regularizers derived in section A. Rectangle boxes are variables. Ellipse boxes are neural networks.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
As a proof of concept experiment, we test our algorithm
on the MNIST dataset [17]. In Section A, we consider experi-
ments with rotated images. In Section B, we explore adversar-
ial attacks. In Section C, we elaborate on the interpretability
of the proposed algorithm.
A. Classification Accuracy on Rotated Images
To test the robustness of model against the rotated images,
we purposely rotate the images from -30 to +30 degrees as
input images. Six models are tested, which are model trained
with original dataset, model trained with rotation augmented
dataset, model trained with FGSM adversarial sample aug-
mented dataset, model trained with PGD adversarial sample
augmented dataset, Bi-directional Info GAN trained with
original dataset and the proposed ADIS-GAN trained with
original dataset. Adding FGSM and PGD adversarial sample
augmented model is to illustrate the robustness of adversarial
training against rotated images. Adding Bi-directional Info
GAN is to illustrate the robustness of generative model without
affine inductive bias against rotated images.
As we can observe from Fig. 5, the model trained with
clean dataset and adversarial augmented dataset suffer from
rotation transformations. PGD Aug and FGSM Aug show
that model trained with adversarial sample augmented dataset
is not robust against rotation transformations. Bi-directional
Info GAN shows that the generative model without affine
inductive bias is not robust against rotation transformations.
ADIS-GAN has achieved over 98 percent accuracy through
all rotation degrees. It has less than 1 percent accuracy
difference with the model trained with rotation augmented
dataset. This demonstrates the effectiveness of ADIS-GAN
against the rotation transformations.
Fig. 5. We purposely rotate the images from MNIST test dataset from -30
degrees to +30 degrees as the input images. Affine Disentangled GAN (ADIS-
GAN) has achieved over 98 percent accuracy through all rotated degrees. It
has less than 1 percent accuracy difference with the model trained on rotational
augmented dataset.
B. Classification Accuracy on Adversarial Images
To test the robustness of model against adversarial attacks,
we create two kinds of adversarial samples with FoolBox [23].
From Table II we can observe that the model trained with
clean dataset and rotation augmented dataset are vulnerable
to adversarial attacks, which shows that affine transformation
augmented data training is orthogonal to adversarial attack.
PGD is a relatively stronger attack compared to FGSM, and
has a higher attack success rate, which shows that adversarial
sample augmented training has its limitation: a stronger attack
can defeat a model trained with a weaker attack. ADIS-GAN
has consistently good performance with those 2 attacks, which
shows it may capture a smoother data distribution that involves
TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY AGAINST ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
Adversarial Attack
Model No Attack FGSM
 = 0.3
PGD
 = 0.3
Original 99.13% 25.88 % 0.10 %
Rotation Aug 98.98 % 11.37 % 0
FGSM Aug 98.60% 86.57 % 61.01 %
PGD Aug 98.93 % 91.55% 85.88%
ADIS-GAN 98.22% 93.10 % 96.53 %
For PGD attack, the binary search is set to False for speed purpose.
The defence method for ADIS-GAN is similar to [24],
which acts as a filter before the given classifier.
larger adversarial manifolds.
C. Interpretability
Affine Disentangled GAN (ADIS-GAN) can express the
data distribution in a more interpretable way, which mitigates
the black box problem of deep learning to some degree. In this
section, mapping between rotation angle and latent vectors is
shown to explain how the algorithm understands rotational
knowledge. Generated images are shown to demonstrate the
relationship between latent space and data space.
Fig. 6. The mapping between rotation angle and latent vector value. The
latent vector value has a linear relationship with the rotation angle. The tiny
disturbance around 0 degrees is due to the different writing style of hand-
written digits.
As we can observe from Fig. 6, the latent vector values
have a linear relationship with rotation angle. This explains
why ADIS-GAN is robust against image rotation since it can
interpret the rotation angles of the given image, which provides
information that helps to understand potential misclassifica-
tions.
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show how the generated images change
with latent vectors. These figures illustrate how the algorithm
represents information.
Fig. 7. Images change with rotation latent vectors.
Fig. 8. Images change with horizontal zoom latent vectors.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Deep CNN based vision systems play a major role in
the autonomous vehicle (AV) perception system. However,
deep CNNs are not robust against affine transformations and
adversarial attacks. The former could happen during normal
driving scenarios when the vehicle is hitting water puddles
or on rural roads, while the latter could happen when a
malicious attack is implemented. It is necessary to overcome
these challenges before integrating deep CNN based vision
system to safety-related applications such autonomous vehicles
(AV).
In this paper, we present the Affine Disentangled GAN
(ADIS-GAN), which is robust to both rotation transformations
and adversarial attacks. We also introduce the development
of affine regularizer. We show that affine transformation
augmented and adversarial augmented training is orthogonal,
which means they can only defend typical attack they have
been trained with.
Affine regularizer captures the symmetry transformations
between latent space and image space during affine transfor-
mation. We believe there are many such kinds of symmetries
in the physical world. By successfully mapping those symme-
tries, we can make the deep learning algorithm more robust
and interpretable.
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APPENDIX A
TWO AFFINE TRANSFORMATION ORDERS
In principle, there are 6 sequences of affine transformations
(R for rotation, K for skew, Z for zoom):
• RKZ - 1,
• RZK - 1,
• KRZ - 2,
• KZR - 2,
• ZKR - 2,
• ZRK - 1.
The zoom operation can be inserted arbitrarily in the se-
quence, since it is a commutative operation. On the other hand,
rotation and skew are non-commutative, therefore, their order
in the sequence is essential. We can categorize the sequences
according to whether the rotation operator is applied before
skew or vice versa, leading to two different categories.
The affine transformation RKZ, which is an example of the
first category, can be written as:
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
]
=
[
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
] [
1 m
n 1
] [
p 0
0 q
]
. (16)
The affine transformation KRZ, which is an example of the
second category, can be written as:
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
]
=
[
1 m
n 1
] [
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
] [
p 0
0 q
]
. (17)
The matrix elements are computed as follows (left: category
1, right: category 2):
A11 = p(cos θ − n sin θ)←→ A11 = p(cos θ +m sin θ),
(18)
A12 = q(m cos θ − sin θ)←→ A12 = q(m cos θ − sin θ),
(19)
A21 = p(sin θ + n cos θ)←→ A21 = p(sin θ + n cos θ),
(20)
A22 = q(m sin θ + cos θ)←→ A22 = q(−n sin θ + cos θ).
(21)
We can observe that A12 and A21 are the same for both
categories, while A11 and A22 are different.
